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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960
without ever designating it a duty to perform military service or to
bear arms.
The court based its holding on the applicant's moral duty to share
in the preservation of his heritage of liberty, rather than upon his po-
tential constitutional duty to perform military service. By doing so it
appears to have postponed to another day the question of the admissi-
bility of conscientious objectors willing to do civilian work of national
importance or to perform noncombatant military service.
LEON MIsTEREK
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Constitutional Right to Counsel. The opinions of the United States
Supreme Court1 have shown basic differences among the members of
the Court as to the duty of a court to provide counsel for an accused
to meet the constitutional requirements of the sixth2 or fourteenth3
amendments. Recent cases decided by the Washington Supreme Court
under the state constitution and statutes indicate the same split of
philosophy as to the degree of protection necessary. It appears that
the Washington court has now adopted a more liberal position which
will demand greater care by trial courts in protecting the rights of
indigent prisoners. While the position of the United States Supreme
Court will be briefly considered,' the purpose of this note is to bring
'Contrast the opinions of Mr. Justice Black in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344
(1957) (dissent) and Mr. Justice Douglas in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448
1958) (dissent) with those of Mr. Justice Jackson in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
58 (1949) (concurring), Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (dissent), and
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (dissent).
2"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." This applies only to trials in federal courts.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
8 "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." This amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantee
of the sixth amendment. Betts v. Brady, supra note 2; In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35
Wn.2d 849, 215 P2d 880 (1950).
'The standards in determining whether failure of the state court to provide counsel
to a defendant at trial and for a reasonable time prior to trial violates due process
under the fourteenth amendment, vary in capital and non-capital cases. In capital
cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) established the rule that the trial court
has an affirmative responsibility to provide counsel to an accused person who does not
have one, unless he intelligently waives his legal right to such assistance. See also
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). In non-capital cases, however, the refusal of a
state court to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant is not necessarily a denial of
due process. Under the fourteenth amendment, states are only required to afford
assistance of counsel when there are special circumstances, such as extreme youth,
ignorance, or an offense of a particularly complicated nature. MORELAND, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Ch. 12 (1959); Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 317, 320 (1950). "In the
great majority of the states, it has been the considered judgment of the... courts that
appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." Betts v.
Brade, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942). In Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) a 57 year old
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to the attention of the Washington practitioner the present position of
the state supreme court as adopted in two, five-to-four decisions5 during
the last term and to discuss a recent decision6 by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit arising out of Washington.
In re Wakefield v. Rhay' was a petition for habeas corpus by a pris-
oner at the state penitentiary who had been convicted of grand larceny
on a guilty plea. At the arraignment, the defendant was informed of
his right to counsel as follows:
Q. Do you understand the nature of the charge? A. I do now....Q. Have you talked to an attorney? A. No, sir. Q. It is your privi-
lege before entering a plea to have an attorney. A. I don't think so.
Q. You don't want an attorney. A. No, sir. Q. Are you ready now
to enter your plea? A. Yes, sir.8
The defendant entered a plea of guilty and judgment was ordered.
The writ for habeas corpus alleged that the defendant was not prop-
erly advised of his right to counsel, so that he could competently and
intelligently waive the right. In re Aichele v. Rhay9 was almost iden-
tical on its facts, except that the defendant was a minor,1  and the
offense was second-degree burglary. As the court took no notice of
these differences, the cases may be considered together. The majority
of the court agreed with each petitioner's contention, granted the writ,
man was charged with an indecent liberties offense and received a sentence of one to
21 years. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a showing of aggravating
circumstances, the Illinois court was under no duty to inform the accused of the right
to counsel, to inquire as to his desire for counsel, or to assign counsel in the absence
of some request. The test appears to be one of "facts and circumstances" with due
process being violated only when the lack of counsel is "offensive to the common
fundamental idea of fairness and right." Betts v. Brady, supra. The current result of
this rule is a trend toward relaxation of the aggravating circumstances constituting a
trial offensive to common ideas of fairness and right. Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773
(1949). The interested reader will find a general attempt by the Supreme Court to
explain its views as to the right to counsel in state courts in capital and non-capital
cases in Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948). See also, Note, 40 NEB. L. REv.
161 (1960), which contends that failure adequately to inform the defendant of his right
to counsel at state expense in a robbery case, violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It is submitted that this position has not yet been adopted by
the Supreme Court.
5 In re Wakefield v. Rhay, 157 Wash. Dec. 61, 356 P.2d 596 (1960), and In re
Aichele v. Rhay, 157 Wash. Dec. 70, 356 P.2d 326 (1960). The effect of these cases is
indicated by In re Wigham v. Rhay, 157 Wash. Dec. 433, 357 P.2d 316 (1961), a per
curiam decision two months later, citing only the Wakefield and Aichele opinions.
6 Griffith v. Rhay, 282 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1960). Contra, Johnson v. State, 169 Neb.
783, 100 N.W.2d 844 (1960), noted, 40 NEB. L. REV. 161 (1960).
7 157 Wash. Dec. 61, 356 P.2d 596 (1960).
8 In re Wakefield v. Rhay, mipra note 7, at 62, 356 P.2d at 596.
9 157 Wash. Dec. 70, 356 P.2d 326 (1960).
10 For information on the special problem of the right of minors to counsel, and
waiver thereof, see Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1960). This problem is beyond the
scope of this note.
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and ordered that each prisoner be remanded to the sheriff of the county
in which he had been tried originally.
Each petitioner had a right to counsel under the Washington Con-
stitution.1 RCW 10.01.11012 and RCW 10.40.030"s implement the
constitutional right, and, in accordance with In re Wilken v. Squier,4
the trial court has the duty (1) to inform the defendant that it is his
right to have counsel before being arraigned; (2) to ascertain whether,
because of the defendant's poverty, he is unable to employ counsel, in
which event the court must inform the defendant that it will appoint
counsel for the defendant at public expense if he so desires; and (3)
to ask whether the defendant desires the aid of counsel. The defend-
ant may, of course, waive the right to counsel, but the waiver must
be made intelligently-that is, the accused must be in possession of
the facts relating to his right. The Wilken case adopted for Wash-
ington the rule established for the federal courts by the case of John-
son v. Zerbst,"5 that:
Merely asking the defendant whether he wants a lawyer does not con-
vey the information that he is entitled to a lawyer at public expense
if he is an indigent person, nor does it impress upon him the impor-
tance of having legal representation if his rights are to be fully pro-
tected. Thus, an indigent defendant's waiver may be made under the
mistaken impression that, since he cannot afford to pay a lawyer, he
cannot have legal representation."
Thus, the court must do more than inform the defendant that he has
a right to counsel. Having determined that he is indigent, the court
must specifically inform him that the court will appoint counsel to
defend him, with no cost to the defendant. Without this being dearly
impressed upon the accused, he will not be found to have waived his
right intelligently, and a subsequent conviction may be challenged.
The dissent takes issue with the reasoning of the majority opinion
on several points. However, the basic difference of opinion seems to
be encompassed in the statement of the writer of the dissenting opin-
11 Art. I, § 22 (amendment 10) (1922): "In criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel."
12 "Whenever a defendant shall be arraigned upon the charge that he has committed
any felony, and shall request the court to appoint counsel and shall... satisfy the court
that he is unable, by reason of poverty, to procure counsel, the court shall appoint
counsel."
13 "If the defendant appear without counsel, he shall be informed by the court that
it is his right to have counsel before being arraigned, and he shall be asked if he desire
the aid of counsel, and if it appear that he is unable to employ counsel by reason of
poverty, counsel shall be assigned to him by the court."
14 50 Wn.2d 58, 309 P.2d 746 (1957).
15 304 U.S. 458 (1938).160 In re Wakefield v. Rhay, 157 Wash. Dec. 61-63, 356 P.2d 596, 597 (1960).
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ion that "the right conferred upon a defendant by the statute is to
have counsel if he desires one, not to have a discourse upon the sub-
ject by the court when he has voluntarily and intelligently waived his
right."'1 Thus, the dissenting judges would have the court ask only
if the defendant wants counsel. If he answers "no," there would be
no further inquiry, nor further need to state his right to counsel with-
out cost to him. As the dissent points out, the court has read into
RCW 10.40.030 the words "the court must inform the defendant that
the court shall appoint counsel for the defendant at public expense if
he so desires." But, as the concurring opinion answers, the right of
the defendant is guaranteed by the state constitution, and the inter-
pretation of the statute by the majority is in accordance with the
spirit of the statute in implementing the constitutional requirement.
Thus, the majority felt that a defendant cannot intelligently waive
his right without knowing that the court would appoint counsel with-
out expense to him; the minority felt that he need not be given this
information to waive his right intelligently.
The dissent also points out that the burden should be on the peti-
tioner to prove that he did not waive his right to counsel. The con-
curring opinion indicates that the majority has not shifted the burden
from the petitioner but has simply allowed the petitioner to carry his
burden of showing his ignorance by showing that he was not advised
of his rights. The state must meet this proof by showing that he had
actual knowledge. The dissent also indicates correctly that the attack
through habeas corpus is made upon the basis that by the failure ade-
quately to advise the defendant of his rights, the jurisdiction of the
court does not attach, and the judgment is void. The reason for this
discussion is not clear. If, as the concurring opinion interpreted it,
the minority felt that the prisoner must now be unalterably released,
the reasoning would appear to be without substance."
The importance of the Wakegeld and Aichele cases is that they have
removed the possibility of varied and indefinite practices of trial courts
in protecting the constitutional right of an accused to counsel, present
under former holdings. Without citing the case, the present decision
would appear to leave little life in State v. Cowan, 9 in which the court
19 25 Wn.2d 341, 170 P.2d 653 (1946), noted, 22 WAsH. L. REv. 63 (1947).
3. Id. at 67, 356 P.2d at 599.
Is To grant the writ of habeas corpus does not mean that the prisoner may escape
further punishment. The court, in directing the release of the petitioner from the
penitentiary, properly directed that he be delivered to the officers of the county to
answer the charge contained in the indictment. 25 Am. Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 153,
154 (1940) ; In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) ; Mitchell v. Youell, 130 F.2d 880 (4th
Cir. 1942); Bryant v. United States, 214 Fed. 51 (8th Cir. 1914).
[VoL 36
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960
held that the following statements by the trial court complied with
the constitutional and statutory requirements. The judge asked a
young sailor charged with robbery if he wished the court to appoint
an attorney, to which the defendant replied, ".... I guess it wouldn't
hurt to have one." The next question brought out the fact that he
had no funds to pay an attorney, and upon being asked if he wished
to delay pleading "until an attorney had been appointed," he said,
"No, I'll plead guilty."
The Wilken case laid down the basic rule applied in the instant
cases, but the language of the trial court which was found to be in-
adequate apparently was so inexplicit" that trial court judges had not
sufficiently changed their procedures to meet the requirements of the
supreme court. In Klapproth v. Squier'I the trial court made no spe-
cific statement that it would appoint counsel for the defendant with-
out expense to him. Only two judges in dissent2 felt that the charge
did not specifically inform the defendant of his right to counsel under
Wilken. The majority distinguished the Klapproth case from Wilken
by stating: "[The Wilken] case was decided upon the basis that the
defendant was 'under the mistaken impression that since he cannot
afford to pay a lawyer, he cannot have legal representation.' In the
instant case, the appointment of counsel was declined."2 It appears
that the same question of declination made intelligently is inherent in
each case. In any event, it would appear that trial court judges would
be well advised that the Wakefield and Aichele cases have changed the
requirements in their courts.
The collateral problem of at what point in a criminal proceeding an
accused has the right to counsel was considered in Griffith v. Rhay,2"
a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from a case
originally tried in Washington. The defendant, nineteen years old, a
previous offender and emotionally unstable, was indicted for murder
in Spokane County. He was recovering in the hospital from four seri-
2 0 The defendant was charged with robbery. At arraignment the following question-
ing took place: "The Court: Mr. Wilken, have you a lawyer? Mr. Wilken: No, sir.
The Court: Do you want a lawyer? Mr. Wilken: No. The Court: You sure you don't
want one? Mr. Wilken: No-don't want one." Accord, Friedbauer v. State, 51 Wn.2d
92, 316 P2d 117 (1957).2150 Wn.2d 675, 314 P.2d 430 (1957).
22 Both dissenters voted with the majority in the Wakefield and Aichele cases.
23 The majority opinion was written by Judge Mallery, who was the author of the
dissent in Wakefield and Aichele. it is apparent that he is expressing the same general
reasoning in both opinions. One can only speculate that the judges who joined Judge
Mallery in the Klapproth case, but not in the later cases, felt that the defendant in
Klapproth was not indigent.
24 282 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1960).
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ous operations as a result of a bullet wound at the time. A confession
was obtained by the prosecuting attorney following a period of ques-
tioning during which he was neither asked if he had an attorney, nor
advised that one would be provided without expense to him if he de-
sired. During the questioning, he was under the effects of a narcotic
and analgesic drug known as demerol. Medical testimony indicated
that the drug would not affect the reliability of the confession, but
testimony indicated the possibility that the defendant might be less
able to exercise his free will in deciding to give or refrain from giving
any statement. The defendant was convicted and after exhausting his
state remedies,25 petitioned the court of appeals for release on a writ
of habeas corpus, contending that lack of counsel during the interro-
gation prior to arraignment was violation of due process under the
fourteenth amendment.2" Judge Hamley, formerly of the Washington
Supreme Court, agreed. Under the case of Powell v. Alabama27 the
fourteenth amendment gives an accused the right to counsel in a capi-
tal case. Judge Hamley indicated that the precise question presented
in Griffith was whether the defendant had this right to counsel during
interrogation prior to arraignment.
Looking at the facts and circumstances of the case-the youth and
background of the defendant, his physical condition, and the possible
effects of drugs-the failure to advise him of a right to counsel vio-
lated "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of jus-
tice."28 The case explicitly recognizes the distinction between the situ-
ation here and that in Crooker v. California" where the defendant was
a college graduate who had attended one year of law school. Yet, the
court appears to conclude that if the defendant lacks the knowledge
of his right to counsel and to remain silent, failure of the investiga-
tive officials clearly to indicate his right to counsel at the expense of
the state at interrogation prior to arraignment may alone violate due
process. There is no discussion in the case of delay prior to arraign-
ment. As this was not a determinative factor, it must be inferred that
had the same circumstances taken place before arraignment was pos-
25 Appeal, judgment affirmed, Griffith v. State, 52 Wn.2d 721, 328 P.2d 897 (1958).
Petition for review denied, unreported. Petition for habeas corpus denied May 25,
1959, unreported. Certiorary denied, 359 U.S. 1015 (1959). Petition for habeas corpus
denied, 177 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Wash. 1959).
26 Petition for habeas corpus to a federal court must be based on violation of a
federal right, not of a state statute or constitution.
27 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
28 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
(1941).
29 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
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sible, the failure to provide counsel would still have violated due
process. To reach this result, the court has shown a willingness to
accede to the proposition that criminal proceedings begin at the time
of arrest, rather than at the time of arraignment.
This problem has often divided the United States Supreme Court
since the "landmark 3 case of Powell v. Alabama." The Court there
stated that
During perhaps the most critical period of the proceeding against these
defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the
beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investiga-
tion and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not
have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much
entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.32 (Em-
phasis added.)
While it is not within the scope of this note to discuss the subsequent
history of the Supreme Court position,"3 it is apparent that the dis-
senting opinions of Mr. Justice Black3 and Mr. Justice Douglas"
have recently become more strenuous in. contending that a prisoner
has a right to counsel prior to arraignment." In the most recent Su-
preme Court decision on the point," their contentions attained the
stature of concurring opinions in which a total of four Justices agreed
that the denial of counsel to one who has been indicted, during the
3 0 Mr. Justice Black in dissent in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 338 (1957).
31287 U.S. 45 (1932).32 d. at 57.33 For the interested reader, a brief but excellent discussion may be found in Corn-
ment, 9 DEPAUL L. REv. 65 (1959).
84 "1 ... firmly believe that the due process clause requires that a person interrogated
be allowed to use legal counsel whenever he is compelled to give testimony to law-
enforcement officers which may be instrumental in his prosecution and conviction for a
criminal offense." In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (dissent).
35 "The demands of our civilization expressed in the due process clause require that
the accused who wants a counsel should have one at any time after the moment of
arrest" Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448 (1958) (dissent).
38The philosophy of the judges presently in the majority and with which investiga-
tive officials would undoubtedly agree is presented by Mr. Justice Jackson concurring
in the result in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949) and dissenting in Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) and Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
"To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is intended to convict
him is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to
the solution of crime because, under our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty
is to protect his client-guilty or innocent-and that in such a capacity he owes no
duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem." His conclusion is that "if the
ultimate question in a criminal trial is the truth and if the circumstances indicate no
violence or threats of it, should society be deprived of the suspect's help in solving a
crime merely because he was confined and questioned when uncounseled? ... I doubt
very much if [the Constitution and Bill of Rights] ... require us to hold that the State
may not take into custody and question one suspected reasonably of an unwitnessed
murder. If it does, the people of this country must discipline themselves to seeing their
police stand by helplessly, while those suspected of murder prowl about unmolested."
37 Spano v. People, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
19611
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
period of police interrogation, is sufficient to make a confession in-
admissible under the fourteenth amendment.
While the Griffith case had its own peculiar facts, Judge Hamley's
opinion appears to adopt the position advocated by the minority of
the United States Supreme Court. It is thus interesting to speculate
why the Supreme Court has refused to review the case." The effect
of the decision on procedure in Washington is also speculative. The
decision of the court of appeals does not have the direct effect which
a United States Supreme Court, or Washington Supreme Court deci-
sion would have. Nevertheless, the holding presents a valuable ave-
nue of appeal from decisions in Washington. With the increased threat
of reversal on a writ of habeas corpus, it may be expected that the
more knowledgeable superior court judges will impose somewhat strict-
er requirements on investigative officials in acceptance of confessions
obtained from a prisoner who was without counsel. 9
From the foregoing material, the writer advances two conclusions:
(1) If the record does not show that the court fully advised the
defendant of his right to counsel and does not show that the defend-
ant had prior knowledge of the nature and extent of his right, it will
be conclusively presumed that he did not competently and intelli-
gently waive that right. To have sufficiently advised the defendant
of his rights, there is an affirmative duty not only to have informed
him of his rights, but also to insure that he understands that the court
will appoint an attorney without cost to him, if he cannot afford one.
This duty is present whether or not the defendant may have indicated
that he does not desire counsel."
(2) The indication is that the United States Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts are advancing toward majority holdings that
will require counsel at each and every step in a state criminal pro-
ceeding." It is probable that state courts will be slowly forced to
adopt the position that criminal proceedings begin at the time of ar-
rest, at least with respect to the right to counsel.
WALTER C. HowE, JR.
38 United States Supreme Court Daily Journal, Jan. 16, 1961, p. 156, No. 560. The
most logical explanation would appear to be that the particular facts of the cases were
rather compelling, and that the majority did not desire to have the question presented
in this form.
39 It would also be expected that investigative officials would continue to resist the
implication of the case for the reasons indicated in n. 36 supra. The result may be an
increase in the number of cases raising the issue.
40 Judge Rosellini concurring in In re Wakefield v. Rhay, 157 Wash. Dec. 61, 63,
356 P.2d 596, 597 (1960).
41 Comment, 9 DEPAUL L. REV. 65, 73 (1959).
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